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12 Vanity and the Daedalian wings
of paper money in Adam Smith
Maria Pia Paganelli
George Stigler (1971) claimed that: ‘it is uncomfortable to explain Smith’s
failure by the failure of everyone else, for he is a better man than everyone
else’ (214). Diverging from Stigler, the problem presented in this chapter
is: how can we explain Smith’s failure when others did not fail, for Smith
is a better man than everyone else?
The failure by Smith diagnosed in this chapter is his lack of vision for
the potential uses and/or misuses as policy instruments of paper money in
general and of public credit in particular – vision that Smith’s contempor-
aries did not lack. Paper money could be used not only as a cheaper sub-
stitute of metallic money, as Smith well realized, but also as a relatively
cheaper policy tool to create more money and try to gain control over the
economy. Public credit could be used not only to finance wars, as Smith
observed, but also to try to fix and stimulate the economy, as some
contemporaries known to him as well as many future economists would
claim (See among others Albertone 1992, Friedman 1969, Humphrey
1993, 2004, Keynes 1936, Monroe 1966, Pribram 1983 Pocock 1985,
Smithin 2003, Viner 1930.) And that paper money may cause hyperinfla-
tion, not just more or less beneficial inflation, is recognized among many
others by Smith’s friend, David Hume, but not by Smith. Why then does
not Smith recognize the potential, either positive or negative, of using
paper money as a policy instrument to gain control over the economy
rather than just as a monetary instrument?
This chapter proposes a possible justification for Smith’s silence, within
the limitations generally associated with all explanations of silences.
Smith’s contemporaries (and successors) tend to use either benevolence
or love of power to justify the positive or negative effects of using paper
money as a policy instrument. Smith, on the other hand, considers neither
love of power nor benevolence as fundamental motivational forces in
human conduct in a commercial society. The downplaying of benevolence
as a major motivational force suggests downplaying the possible use of
paper money to stimulate the economy; and the downplaying of the love
of power suggests downplaying the possible misuse of paper money that
causes hyperinflation. A commercial society like the one Smith describes is
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based on forces such as self-centered vanity instead. And vanity, mediated
through commerce and market forces, strips paper money of its negative
as well as positive potential as a policy instrument: the analysis of paper
money as a policy instrument becomes superfluous because money has no
motivational basis to become a policy instrument. Money remains simply a
unit of account, a means of exchange, and a credit instrument.
The chapter develops as follows. The first section presents a general
overview of the eighteenth century debate on money, in which Smith does
not participate. The second section presents Smith’s analysis of the differ-
ent forms of paper money. A brief account of his analysis of the benefits
and the costs associated with paper money follows. The subsequent sec-
tions show how vanity, rather than love of power or benevolence, seems to
motivate Smithian human beings, and how, in a commercial society based
on self-interested vanity, public credit is neither a threat nor a blessing, as
some of Smith’s contemporaries thought.
Policy instrument: a new function of money
Before proceeding a clarification is due. While it is true that paper money,
paper credit, and public credit are not necessarily equivalent, it is also true
that in the eighteenth century these distinctions were not necessarily as
well defined as they are today. They were often treated as synonymous.1 In
this chapter there is no attempt to modernize or correct the eighteenth
century understanding of money, but simply to report it.
In the eighteenth century the State begins to have the achievement of
public happiness as one of its objectives. The State has now the opportun-
ity to be active in the betterment of society and of the economy.2 The
explicit claim of direct control over society, in one form or another, is
accompanied by the search for appropriate tools. Money begins to show
its potential for being one of these tools.
Money has two traditional functions: unit of account and medium of
exchange. In the eighteenth century money debates, a third function is
added: money can be a policy instrument to progress toward public happi-
ness. Money could now become a policy instrument to promote economic
growth and public happiness, and to pay for it. Paper money, especially
when irredeemable, makes money a more malleable and controllable
policy instrument than any commodity money. Paper money is generated
by both private credit as well as public credit. Control over the economy is
achieved by controlling either or, better, both.
Many eighteenth century authors begin their treatises on money declar-
ing that the purpose of their work is to contribute to the achievement of
public happiness. Something like this is typical: ‘I have the Interest and
Advancement of Trade (on which the Welfare and Happiness of Mankind
so much depends) really at Heart’ (Vanderlint [1734] 1970, dedication).
The State is justified to expand its activities to include not only warfare but
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also welfare3: ‘what I understand by political oeconomy . . . the object of
the art . . . is, to provide food, other necessaries, and employment to every
one of the society. . . . To provide a proper employment for all the
members of a society is the same as to model and conduct every branch of
their concerns’ (Steuart [1767] 1966, 28).
Focusing on how to achieve public happiness helps in the analysis of
different conceptions of the role of inflation. Traditionally inflation, via
debasement, is generated simply to finance an increase in military expen-
ditures. Indeed:
I am very glad to pursue this matter somewhat further, so that an
example will not be made of something that is not one. In the First
Punic War the as, which was supposed to be of twelve ounces of
copper, weighed only two, and in the Second Punic War, it weighed
only one. This retrenching corresponds to what we today call expan-
sion of the currency. . . . The [Roman] republic [inflated because it]
was not in a position to pay its debt.
(Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 413)
Debasement, or inflation, is in fact traditionally thought of only as a ‘dirty
trick’ to get rid of debts that were too big to be paid otherwise. No inten-
tion to control, regulate, stabilize, fine-tune, or improve the economy is
present: only paying off a very large debt. Indeed, calls for inflation are
justified either as a backward-looking ‘patch’4 or as the result of vicious
behaviors.5 In Montesquieu’s words: ‘bad faith or need makes them with-
draw part of the metal from each piece of money, leaving it with the same
name’ (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 400, emphasis added).
But in the eighteenth century, starting with John Law, among others,
we see calls for inflation based on the idea that increasing the quantity of
money would increase wealth and therefore the happiness of the people.
Money becomes an important ally of the new order. Money, being
required to pay for the re-creation or the improvement of the new social
order, and, if controllable and active on the economy, becomes an import-
ant policy instrument to be used to construct progress and achieve happi-
ness in a country. But if money has to be a fine-tuning instrument, using
metals is not easy. The technology of debasing becomes too complicated
and expensive, as shown in the debate on recoinage of the seventeenth
century.6 Paper, issued both through private credit channels and through
public credit, is an easier and cheaper technology to produce a more mal-
leable and controllable form of money that better fits its new role of pro-
moter of new advantages, independently of the needs of financing wars.
This eighteenth century debate opens the door to the conception,
development, and eventual acceptance of present-day fiat money. But,
while most of Smith’s contemporaries take part in this debate in one way
or the other, Smith’s voice is absent. Adam Smith has a meticulous
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account of money, but only in its traditional functions. Money for Smith is
only a unit of account and a means of exchange, and public credit is only
a form of paper money, useful to pay for expensive wars. Furthermore,
not only is money not a policy instrument to Smith, but he does not even
seem to consider it as a conceivable option for others, as he quickly dis-
misses those who think otherwise. Smith looks at the same phenomena as
his contemporaries but sees different things.
What is paper money?
Smith describes the use of different kinds of money in detailed fashion.
He has a meticulous account of paper money, which mirrors his
contemporaries’. Smith’s unique signature is present in his description of
the origins of paper money and in his policy prescriptions. But let us start
with a brief explanation of the different forms of paper money that Smith
observes.
Smith claims that money is an instrument that facilitates trade, decreas-
ing the transaction costs involved in barter (WN I.iv.2, 37–8). Money may
take different forms in different times and places (WN I.iv.3–5, 38–9). Pre-
cious metals, such as gold and silver, are commonly used as money in the
Western world, both within each country and among different countries.
But the eighteenth century sees the increasing use of another kind of
money: paper. Paper money takes various forms, two of the major forms
being receipts and credit. Paper money could be issued, at different times,
both privately, by individuals and banks, and by the government.
Paper money in the form of receipts takes place when receipts for bank
deposits circulate as money (bank money), while the precious metals are
safely kept in a bank. The circulating receipts are the claims on deposits.
Banks issuing these papers, in theory, could either be banks with 100
percent reserves or with just fractional reserves. Banks with fractional
reserves are banks that accept deposits, giving a paper claim on it to the
depositor, and offer loans and lines of credit, lending out a part of the
deposits received and therefore keeping only a fraction of their reserves.
Borrowers pay interest on the loan, generating revenue for the bank.
When the bank issues loans or credit, they could be in metal or in paper
notes. Some notes go back to bankers for payment, while others keep cir-
culating. According to Smith, bankers need only about 20 percent of gold
as reserve for immediate demands, the economy running on a fifth of the
gold and silver otherwise required (WN II.ii.29, 292–3). In practice, all the
banks are fractional reserve banks, even if some, like the bank of Amster-
dam, claim otherwise. Smith describes the practical difficulties of sustain-
ing a 100 percent reserve: how could the Bank of Amsterdam operate with
no revenue? His conclusion is that what the bank claims in words is not
present in the facts (WN II.ii.104, 328). On the other hand, other
thinkers, such as David Hume, propose an alternative view. Hume, who
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thinks 100 percent reserve banks are the only acceptable banks, also
understands the operational problem of banks with no revenue. But he
suggests the introduction of government subsidies to maintain the opera-
tions of the banks as a possible way to keep the banks in business (Hume,
Essays, 285).
Credit takes different forms. It could be backed with collateral (cash
accounts) – ‘melting’ non-liquid assets – or it could be backed not by tan-
gible goods but by the creditworthiness granted to men ‘of credit’. The
guarantee might come from the creditor’s good reputation or from other
people’s good words vouching for his good reputation. Credit could be
granted to individuals or companies, as well as to the government. Public
credit is indeed the credit granted to the government, which could also be
either backed or unbacked. Backed public credit usually consists of mort-
gaging future tax revenue. Unbacked credit could be granted on the basis
of trust in the current government. The duration of the debt might vary. It
might be short-term – with a fund that would allow paying back the inter-
est and the principal – or ‘for perpetuity’ – with a fund large enough to
pay only the interest (WN V.iii.12, 912).
Finally, notes may be traded at a discount if their real value is less than
their nominal value, usually due to a decrease in trust in the issuer or due
to over-issuing. They could be traded with agio, that is, notes may be
traded at more than their nominal value because of the extra security
offered by a well respected bank (WN II.ii.104, 328).
Benefits of paper money
But why are England, and Europe in general, developing these different
forms of money? Are not gold and silver good enough monies?
Smith claims that, with the development of commerce, paper money
develops as a cheaper form of money. (For an account of Smith’s theory
of banking see Gherity 1994.) He describes the benefits of private paper
credit in a commercial society in Book II, and the benefits of public paper
credit in a commercial society in Book V.
In a commercial society, using gold and silver as domestic currency has
a high opportunity cost. Gold and silver in their monetary forms can be
used either domestically as currency or can be sent abroad to buy cheaper
consumption or investment goods. Given the opportunity to use precious
metals, it is natural to observe the emergence of substitutes like paper to
be used as domestic currency while the precious metals are sent abroad
(WN II.ii.26, 292). Smith indeed explains that money is not part of the
revenue of a country, but, due to its function as means of exchange, it is
the ‘great wheel’ on which revenue and goods circulate in society (WN
II.ii.14, 289, and WN II.ii.23, 291).
Echoing Hume, Smith considers demand for money constant, given a
certain level of economic activity: if money supply is increased via paper,
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‘whatever is poured into it beyond this sum cannot run in it [in the
economy], but must overflow . . . it will, therefore, be sent abroad, in
order to seek that profitable employment which it cannot find at home.
But the paper cannot go abroad; because at a distance from the banks
which issue it, and from the country in which payment of it can be exacted
by law, it will not be received in common payments. Gold and silver, there-
fore . . . will be sent abroad’ (WN II.ii.30, 293) to buy goods and bring
home profits (WN II.ii.31–2, 294). When paper substitutes for gold, gold
increases funds for maintenance of industry, the quantity of that industry,
and the annual product of land and labor. Therefore, wherever cash
accounts are used ‘every merchant can, without imprudence, carry on a
greater trade than he otherwise could’ (WN II.ii.46, 299–300).
Smith explains further that using paper rather than gold frees gold
from unproductive uses by the following suggestive image of paper money
as an aerial highway that frees fertile ground for more productive uses:
It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a
greater part of that capital active and productive than would otherwise
be so, that the most judicious operations of banking can increase the
industry of the country . . . The part of his capital which a dealer is
obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money for answer-
ing occasional demands, is so much dead stock, which . . . produces
nothing either to him or his country. The judicious operations of
banking enable him to convert this dead stock into active and produc-
tive stock . . . The judicious operations of banking, by substituting
paper in the room of a great part of this gold and silver, enables the
country to convert a great part of this dead stock into active and pro-
ductive stock . . . The gold and silver money which circulated in any
country may very properly be compared to a highway, which, while it
circulates and carries to market all the grass and corn of the country,
produces itself not a single pile of either. The judicious operations of
banking, by proving, if I may be allowed so violent a metaphor, a sort
of wagon-way through the air; enable the country to convert, as it
were, a great part of its highways into good pastures and corn fields,
and thereby to increase very considerably the annual produce of its
land and labour.
(WN, II.ii.86, 320–1)
When the increase in commerce renders metals expensive as domestic
currency, metals will leave an opening for paper, seeking cheaper (more
productive) employments. With some caveats to be presented later in this
work, paper money is therefore a beneficial consequence of the increased
commerce in a commercial society.
In the form of public credit, paper money allows smoothing revenue
collection over time, which is useful especially in the case of wars:
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By means of borrowing they are enabled, with a very moderate
increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year, money sufficient for car-
rying on the war, and by the practice of perpetual funding they are
enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually
the largest possible sum of money.
(WN V.iii.37, 919–20)
For the purposes of this chapter, the most interesting part of Smith’s
account of the benefits of paper money is what Smith does not mention.
The eighteenth century experiences the first calls to try to manipulate the
money supply to stimulate the economy, mostly through easing or tighten-
ing private and public credit. Some of these calls were less sophisticated
than others. But Smith does not seem to pay much attention either to this
potential or to those who claim its relevance.
In the eighteenth century a (not very sophisticated) way to justify
money creation is the attempt to fight poverty. Poverty is associated with
the lack of money. A way to claim to be fighting poverty is to generate
money, something more easily done with paper7 than with precious
metals. (See, for example, Vanderlint [1734] 1970.) Another way to justify
money creation is to claim that
public incumbrances are advantageous, independent of the necessity
of contracting them; that any state, even though it were not pressed by
a foreign enemy, could not possibly have embraced a wiser expedient
for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds, and debts,
and taxes, without limitation.
(Hume, Essays, 352; critical of this view)
Money and riches tend to go hand in hand just like lack of money and
poverty tend to be observed at the same time. The traditional understand-
ing, to which Smith subscribes, sees wealth generating money, and poverty
lack of money. The competing view that makes its way through the
eighteenth century reverses the direction of causation, or, according to
Hume, it ‘mistake[s], as is too usual, a collateral effect for a cause’
(Hume, Essays, 290). The mechanisms through which an increase in
money supply ‘quickens’ industry are not always clear. Sometimes they are
recognized as mysterious, as for example by Isaac de Pinto ([1774] 1969)
who claims that ‘Circulation and credit are two springs, the play of which
is not thoroughly understood’ (115). Sometimes they simply sound
alchemistic, such as Berkeley’s query No. ‘233. Whether the credit of the
public funds be not a mine of gold to England; and whether any step that
should lessen this credit, ought not to be dreaded?’ (Berkeley [1735]
1979), or de Pinto’s explicit reference to magic: ‘This mass of wealth has
been successively produced with the same specie, by the magic of credit
and circulation’ (de Pinto [1774] 1969, 20).8 Nevertheless, many think,
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‘The more notes the Banks can circulate . . . the more will industry and
trade be promoted. Nor can there be any limit’ (Wallace [1734] 1969, 19).
Smith remains silent instead. His only words9 are his comments (or lack of
thereof) on John Law’s ‘visionary project’, which is dismissed simply as
‘the most extravagant project both of banking and stock-jobbing that,
perhaps, the world ever saw’ (WN II.ii.78, 317, emphasis added).
Costs of paper money
Just as Smith deals with some of the common benefits (real or perceived)
of paper money, but not all of them, he deals with some of the common
costs (real or perceived) of paper money, but not with all of them. Smith
tells us that the costs of paper money in a commercial society are associ-
ated with the tendency of over-issuing paper money. He does not tell us
that using paper money to stimulate the economy can cause hyperinfla-
tion, For Smith, creditors tend to like promissory notes more than loans in
precious metals because they free idle capital, and because they could pay
back a little at a time. The interest on the notes is revenue to the bank.
The more notes issued, the more interest collected, the more revenue
generated, and most likely, the higher the profits for the bank. And, if
banks discount bills of exchange with promissory notes, they could make
more profit than with gold (WN II.ii.43, 298–9). Creditors, therefore, are
tempted to ask for over-issuing of credit, and banks are tempted to over-
issue credit.
In addition, ‘over-trading of some bold projectors . . . was the original
cause of this excessive circulation of paper money’ (WN II.ii.57, 304).
Because of their high profits, certain commercial activities attract mer-
chants’ attention. Merchants ask for money to participate in these prof-
itable trades. But as more and more merchants enter these markets,
profits are eaten away (over-trading) and with them the resources to pay
the banks back (over-issuing).
Furthermore, banks should lend ‘that part of it [capital] only, which he
would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready
money for answering occasional demands’ (WN II.ii.58, 304). ‘Fixed
capital’ pays back only after many years: too much time for a bank. The
capital that could be repaid only after years should therefore not be bor-
rowed through banks, but through mortgages and/or bonds from private
people (WN II.ii.64, 307). But, when wise banks reject a credit extension,
traders use ‘shift of drawing and redrawing’ to raise the money used to
over-trade (WN II.ii.65, 308).
And because, according to Smith, paper and metallic money are substi-
tutes in the domestic market, over-issuing paper generates an oversupply
of money. But paper and metals are not substitutes in international
markets, as paper cannot be sent abroad. The domestic quantity of money
would return to its natural level by reconverting paper into gold and
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silver, and sending the precious metals abroad. Banks, therefore, have to
be ready to convert paper into gold and silver at all times. If they over-
issue, they might not be as ready. And if they signal hesitation or dif-
ficulties, they might generate bank runs (WN II.ii.48, 300–1).
This intrinsic instability and potential for runs caused Smith to say:
The commerce and industry of the country, however, it must be
acknowledged, though they may be somewhat augmented, cannot be
altogether so secure, when they are thus as it were, suspended upon
the Daedalian wings of paper money, as when they travel about upon
the solid ground of gold and silver.
(WN II.ii.86, 320–1)
As far as costs associated with public credit, Smith seems to believe that
public debt may be abundantly issued because paper credit ‘is always an
obvious and easy expedient for getting out of the present difficulty’ (WN
V.iii.40, 920–1), the present difficulties being the cost of wars. For Smith,
the danger of using public credit is therefore not over-issuing, but the
decrease in the cost of wars, which may increase their length (WN V.iii.50,
926).
Smith’s apparent lack of concern about the possible over-issuing of
public credit ‘independent[ly] of the necessity of contracting [it] . . . even
though [a state] were not pressed by a foreign enemy’, as Hume said, is
puzzling, especially in light of the famous attacks his friend Hume makes
against public credit (‘[E]ither the nation must destroy public credit, or
public credit will destroy the nation’ (Hume, Essays, 360–1)). Hume
claims that an economic collapse is near as money manipulations are
raising prices. Smith simply and quickly dismisses the higher prices to
which Hume refers as due ‘probably, to the badness of the seasons’ (WN
II.2.96, 324).
So, why does Smith seem to close his eyes to what others considered
positive as well as negative potentials of paper money?
Blinding vanity
A possible explanation for why Smith seems to stop short in his analysis of
paper money may be that his project is to analyze the potential of commer-
cial society. As shown below, most of the reflections of Smith’s contempor-
aries base the potential of paper money either on the assumption of
benevolence or on the assumption of desire for power. On the other
hand, for Smith, in a commercial society the most relevant force in its differ-
ent expressions is a self-interested vanity, not benevolence and not power.
Smith may be able to dismiss some theoretical and/or practical effects of
paper money as not relevant for an apparatus built on vanity and com-
merce such as his.
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Those who advocate the benefits of increasing money supply (by
increasing money to stimulate the economy) generally justify their claims
as motivated by what today we call the ‘benevolent dictator’ assumption:10
the sovereign wants to act upon the economy because he is moved by
benevolence, by genuine care for the well-being of society. So, for
example, Bishop Berkeley ([1735] 1979) claims not only that the State
should encourage the industry of its members (query 3) but also asks in
query No.:
346. Whether, therefore, a legislator should be content with a vulgar
share of knowledge? Whether he should not be a person of reflexion
and thought, who hath made his study to understand the true nature
and interest of mankind, how to guide men’s humours and passions,
how to incite their active powers, how to make their several talents co-
operate to the mutual benefit of each other, and the general good of
the whole?
The idea of the ‘benevolent dictator’ is restated, among others, by Sir
James Steuart when he combines the interests of the individuals and the
interest of the public in the interest of sovereign and says: ‘Virtue and
justice, when applied to government, mean no more than a tender affec-
tion for the whole society, and an exact and impartial regard for the inter-
est of every class’ (Book 1, 20).
On the other hand, those who emphasize the perniciousness of paper
money, and of its increases, tend to see knavery and desire for power as
the motivation for action of the sovereign (for example, Hume, Essays).
(For an account of knavery in Hume see Farrant and Paganelli 2005.)
Benevolence and love of power may not necessarily be considered as
major forces driving human conduct. If they are not, the theories based
on them may be quickly dismissed as ‘extravagances’ or, at worst, short-
term problems. And this seems to be what Smith does. To understand this
claim, let us walk though Smith’s system.
Let us take as a starting point the view that TMS and WN are to be read
together and are not in contradiction with each other. One of the most
convincing accounts of this view comes from James Otteson (2002).
Otteson describes the moral system of TMS as similar to the market system
of WN. This communality is based on the fact that the Smithian man is a
man hard-wired to desire the attention and approbation of others. The
same self-interest (or desire for approbation) that drives every man to
better his material conditions drives every man to better his moral
conditions.
From whence, then, arises that emulation which runs through all the
different ranks of men, and what are the advantages which we
propose by that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our
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condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of
with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages
which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease,
or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always founded upon
the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation.
(TMS I.iii.2.1, 50, emphasis added)
Similarly, man’s moral development depends on the presence of the
impartial spectator, whose approbation human vanity wants:
We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other
fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If upon placing our-
selves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and
motives which influence it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the
approbation of this supposed equitable judge.
(TMS III.i.2, 110)11
The entire Smithian apparatus seems therefore to revolve (or collapse?)
around the innate human vain desire to attract the attention of other
people.12 The desire of power boils down to vanity, and public benevo-
lence boils down to vanity as well. The desire to pursue ‘power and pre-
heminence . . . [is motivated by the same human desire] to be observed, to
be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and
approbation . . . It is the vanity . . . which interest us’ (TMS I.iii.2.1, 50).
The alleged ‘public benevolence’ of the sovereign boils down to ‘his own
interest, his own vanity, the interest and vanity of many of his friends and
companions’ (TMS VI.ii.2.6, 230; Cf. TMS VI.ii.2.16, 233). In the Smithian
system, we are left with only vanity. (On the importance of vanity in Smith,
see also Lerner 1999 and Schliesser 2003.)
The analysis of the origins of both private and public paper credit con-
firms that vanity is the force at its base. In fact, the development of private
paper money is linked to human vanity because paper money is an instru-
ment that facilitates commerce. As we just saw, commerce is the instru-
ment through which a man fulfills his hard-wired desire to ‘better his
condition’, which in its turn, Smith claims, is a function of the hard-wired
human vanity which is at the very base of all human actions. Furthermore,
even the development of public credit is linked to vanity, as dealt with in
Book V of the WN.
Smith’s most interesting, albeit less explored, characterization of the
origins of paper money comes from Book V, where he deals with public
credit. There, Smith presents the common explanation that public credit
is a product of war financing: ‘The want of parsimony in time of peace,
imposes the necessity of contracting debt in time of war. When war comes,
there is no money in the treasury but what is necessary for carrying on the
ordinary expence of the peace establishment’ (WN V.iii.4, 909).
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What is interesting for our purposes is the reason for ‘the want of parsi-
mony in time of peace’. The ‘want of parsimony’ is, for Smith, caused by
the presence of commerce. In non-commercial societies, tastes are unre-
fined, and luxuries and useless trinkets basically unknown. The natural
and unavoidable human vanity and the human desire for ostentation are
therefore much constrained:
The same disposition to save and to hoard prevailed in the sovereign,
as well as in the subjects. Among the nations to whom commerce and
manufactures are little known, the sovereign, it has already been
observed in the fourth book, is in a situation which naturally disposes
him to the parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that situation the
expence even of a sovereign cannot be directed by that vanity which
delights in the gaudy finery of a court. The ignorance of the times
affords but few of the trinkets in which that finery consists.
(WN V.iii.2, 908)
The wealth that accompanies commerce allows vanity to bring extrava-
gances so that
In a commercial country abounding with every sort of expensive
luxury, the sovereign, in the same manner as almost all the great pro-
prietors in his dominions, naturally spends a great part of his revenue
in purchasing those luxuries. His own and the neighbouring countries
supply him abundantly with all the costly trinkets which compose the
splendid, but insignificant pageantry of a court.
(WN V.iii.3, 909)
If Smith’s account of the origins of paper money could be given in a nut-
shell, with all the limitations of such brevity, it would go more or less as
follows: vanity generates paper money thanks to the development of com-
merce. The more commercial a society is, the more vanity is freed from con-
straints, the more money is spent on unproductive trinkets, the less cash is
left, the more credit and paper is needed. Smith is indeed exploring the
potential of (building?) a tight commercial society. To Smith benevolence
and love of power are not commercial motivations, but vanity is. Benevo-
lence and love of power do not enter in Smith’s commercial picture and
as a consequence neither do the sub-systems built on them. On the other
hand, for Smith vanity is a driving force of commerce and the sub-systems
that he describes are based on it.
Cost–benefit analysis
A commercial society may be a feasible society for Smith, as it possesses
not only the seeds for development and prosperity (vanity), but also the
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mechanisms to persist (mostly13 free markets). A commercial society gen-
erates wealth, in part, through the natural introduction of credit. But, as
we saw, paper money may threaten a commercial society because of its
intrinsic instability associated with over-issuing. But this instability may not
be irremovable, as its cause may eventually be removed. And the processes
through which instabilities are removed seem to be built into paper
money itself.
Smith implies that neither merchants nor banks should over-issue as it
may bring all into bankruptcy. But Smith’s recriminations do not prevent
banks from over-issuing (WN II.ii.41–87, 297–320). The reason for over-
issuing is, for Smith, ignorance – banks do not always understand what is
best for them (WN II.ii.53, 302). Indeed, he reiterates more than once,
‘every particular banking company has not always understood or attended
to its own particular interest, and the circulation has frequently been over-
stocked with paper-money’ (WN II.2.56, 303).
The ignorance of banks shows in different ways. First, banks fail to
understand that paper should be issued only to replace idle reserve
money, not to fund entire projects (WN II.ii.71, 311). Projectors fool
banks when traders draw and redraw upon one another. If they do it from
the same bank, the bank will realize what is going on. But traders use dif-
ferent banks, and may add more projectors in the circle. Distinguishing
between a real bill of exchange and a fraudulent one becomes more diffi-
cult. And when a banker realizes he is discounting fake bills, it is too late
(WN II.ii.72, 311–12). Finally, banks also tend to overestimate the inflow
of money and underestimate their outflow (WN II.ii.76, 315–16).
Fortunately, ‘nature’ takes care of it, as competitive markets are gener-
ally good schools.14 If a bank that had over-issued tried to fulfill its
promises to convert paper into metal upon demand, it would face an
outflow of precious metal larger than its inflow. The acquisition of pre-
cious metals to fulfill its demand might quickly become very expensive. It
is therefore in the bank’s interest not to over-issue, because what it would
gain, if not more, it would have to spend to keep its coffers ready. And the
bank, losing profits, would decrease the amount of issuing (WN
II.ii.49–51, 301–2).
Moreover, competition among banks brings an additional check on
issuing too much paper. And if something goes wrong, the damage is
more limited. (For a general account of decentralized systems in Smith,
see Paganelli 2005.)
The late multiplication of banking companies in both part of the
United Kingdom, an event by which many people have been much
alarmed, instead of diminishing, increases the security of the publick.
It obliges all of them to be more circumspect in their conduct, and, by
not extending their currency beyond its due proportion to their cash,
to guard themselves against those malicious runs, which the rivalship
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of so many competitors is always ready to bring upon them. It
restrains the circulation of each particular company within a narrower
circle, and reduces their circulating notes to a smaller number. By
dividing the whole circulation into a greater number of parts, the
failure of any one company, an accident which, in the course of
things, must sometimes happen, becomes of less consequence to the
publick.
(WN II.ii.106, 329)
Ignorance is therefore a curable disease for Smith. Once banks under-
stand what they have ‘not always understood’ banks will not over-issue.
And because every man is driven by his desire to better his condition,
there is no reason to believe that banks will forever ‘not attend to [their]
own particular interest’. To a potential destructive force there is therefore
a market antidote. The instability seen in the past does not have to persist
in the future.15
Similarly, the problems associated with public credit are not really
problems. First, longer wars due to their decreased immediate cost may
not always be a cost to all, as some people may enjoy the longer length
(WN V.iii.37, 919). To Smith the real problem seems to be over-expenditure
by the government, rather than the credit issued to pay for it. The
problem seems to be war,16 not paper money. WN concludes by recom-
mending to Great Britain a ‘diminution of her expenditure . . . [as] it is
surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expence of
defending those provinces in times of war, and of supporting any part of
their civil or military establishments in time of peace’ (WN V.iii.92, 946).
The fact that public credit is not a problem for Smith is confirmed by
the explicit reference that in a commercial society debts are usually miti-
gated by the prosperity commerce generates. So Smith reassures:
The same commercial state of society which, by the operation of
moral causes, brings government in this manner into the necessity of
borrowing, produces in the subjects both an ability and an inclination
to lend. If it commonly brings along the necessity of borrowing, it like-
wise brings along with it the facility of doing so.
(WN V.iii.5, 910)17
An additional constraint on possible abuses of paper money, which is actu-
ally an additional benefit of the introduction of paper money, is the devel-
opment of an ethical system and of a system of justice, or at least of a
system that uses credit as a signal of virtue. Smith echoes Wallace, among
others, when he realized that ‘None will give credit but to men of
integrity, prudence, and activity, or to men of substance. Here then are
natural checks and limits, beyond which credit will not be extended’
(Wallace [1734] 1969, 28). Chiara Baroni (2002) superbly presents how
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Smith sees credit as an instrument to develop a ‘man of credit’, a virtuous
man to whom it is worth lending. And, similarly, at the government level,
as Wallace claims, ‘WHEN a free government is able to contract great debts
by borrowing from its subjects, this is a certain sign, that it has gained the
confidence of the people’ (Wallace [1734] 1969, 53), so Smith states that
a government that is able to have credit is a just government – a govern-
ment that is trusted with the use of private property:
Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any
state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice
of government. The same confidence which disposes great merchants
and manufactures, upon ordinary occasions, to trust their property to
the protection of a particular government; disposes them, upon extra-
ordinary occasions, to trust that government with the use of their
property . . . The security which it grants to the original creditor, is
made transferable to any other creditor, and, from the universal confi-
dence in the justice of the state, generally sells in the market for more
than was originally paid for it.
(WN V.iii.7, 910; see also Rosenberg 1990)
The commercial society that Smith analyzes (or proposes?) is therefore a
sound society. It requires vanity to generate it and markets to sustain it.
Paper money is an example of one of the sub-systems that contribute to its
subsistence and development (cf. Skaggs 1999). Vanity is at the base of a
commercial society that generates, among other things, paper money. The
limitations that paper money generate may be corrected by commerce
itself. Not much more is needed.
Conclusion
During the eighteenth century the introduction of paper money in the
form of paper credit begins to flourish. Its functioning is described by
many, including Smith. Its potential as a policy instrument is a topic of
debate for many, but not for Smith.
The expansionary monetary policies associated with the positive effects
of paper money are usually rooted in benevolent motivations. The fears of
monetary expansion associated with paper money are usually rooted in
the fear of the love of power. Smith is aware of the claims that paper
money may be the instrument that solves a country’s economic problems,
as benevolent leaders will use it wisely. Indeed, he is aware of the attempts
to use paper money to solve a country’s problems such as the scheme
developed by John Law. He is also aware of the claims that paper money
may be the instrument of a country’s destruction, as knavish leaders will
use it to increase their power. Indeed, he is aware that the then high
prices may be the first symptom of the pending destruction, as argued by
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David Hume. But Smith simply and quickly dismisses Law’s scheme as
‘extravagant’ and Hume’s high prices as due to ‘bad weather’ rather than
a sign of the pending catastrophe caused by paper money. Using money as
a policy instrument does not seem to be part of Smith’s view of the world.
This chapter claims that what looks like Smith’s lack of vision for using
paper money as a policy instrument to stimulate the economy is due to his
focus on understanding a purely commercial society. In a commercial
society like the one Smith describes, not only is there little need for
government, but there is also little need for love of power and for benevo-
lence. Smith seems to imply that a world in which power is the predomi-
nant motivation of human action is a world of force; on the other hand,
considering benevolence as the predominant motivation would describe a
world of angels. A commercial world, however, has a different motiva-
tional force at its base. For Smith, this motivational force is vanity. The
absence of the accounts of positive and negative potential of manipulating
paper money in Smith’s works may imply that only human vanity is (or
should be?) necessary to have a functioning, prosperous, and moral
society based on commerce.
Notes
Thanks to Tyler Cowen, Dan Houser, David Levy, Leonidas Montes, James
Otteson, Eric Schliesser, Todd Seavey, the participants of the 2005 HES meeting,
and an anonymous referee.
1 See for example Hume (Essays, 355) ‘Public stocks, being a kind of paper-
credit, have all the disadvantages attending that species of money. They banish
gold and silver from the most considerable commerce of the state, reduce
them to common circulation, and by that means render all provisions and
labour dearer than otherwise they would be.’
2 The possible reasons for this development in the role of the State are outside
the scope of this chapter; its presence is simply accepted.
3 ‘Such members of the society as remain unemployed, either from natural infir-
mities or misfortunes, and who thereby become a load upon others, are really a
load upon the state. This is a disease which must be endured. There is no body,
no thing, without diseases. A state should provide retreats of all sorts, for the dif-
ferent conditions of her decayed inhabitants: humanity, good, policy, and chris-
tianity, require it’ (Steuart [1767] 1966: 73). Or: ‘59 Whether to provide
plentifully for the poor be not feeding the root, the substance whereof will shoot
upwards into the branches, and cause the top to flourish?’ Berkeley, Query 59;
‘158 When the root yieldeth insufficient nourishment, whether men do not top
the tree to make the lower branches thrive?’ (Berkeley [1735] 1979: Query 158)
4 ‘Bankruptcy is, without any question, superior to new excises. It is easier and
more expedient. . . . But bankruptcy is too sudden and strikes too impetuously.
Worse still, it strikes the people around the prince, the most powerful people,
from whom tumult and rebellion are to be feared; it slashes his faith with
hideous scars, thus weakening it. Augmentation of the currency had the same
effect as bankruptcy, but the harm from it is slower to come and is distributed
over everyone as it fails’ (Galiani [1751] 1977, 188).
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5 ‘. . . augmentation of the currency arises from the fact that it has rarely been
undertaken in order to satisfy the true needs of a virtuous prince. It has almost
always been due to greed or to false counsel of only apparent utility’ (Galiani
[1751] 1977, 168).
6 See for example Bishop Berkeley [1735] 1979, who, while disliking gold and
silver money (Query 42–3, 283–7), promotes paper money as an instrument to
achieve public happiness (Query 224, 288–9).
7 See, among the examples, the requests to print more money during the French
Revolution (Albertone 1992).
8 The tradition to see commercial and monetary activities somehow magical is
long. See, for example Jonson 1987.
9 There is a reference, again quickly dismissive, to Sir Robert Walpole’s policy
proposal in the student notes to Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence where
Smith claims that ‘Sir Robert Walpole endeavoured to shew that the public
debt was no inconvenience, tho’ it is to be supposed that a man of his abilities
saw the contrary himself’ (LJ, 515).
10 A ‘dictator’ is a single decision maker, a person (legal or real) with sovereign
decision power. An assembly as well as a monarch may be ‘dictator’. Usually, a
‘dictator’ contrasts a decisional structure based on a plurality of centers.
‘Benevolent’ means that the ‘dictator’ is public-spirited, not self-interested. A
‘benevolent dictator’ will always do only what is best for society, and not what is
best for himself.
11 The desire of praiseworthiness is the desire to gain the approbation of the
impartial spectator by emulation, once our man within has become impartial.
‘Emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally
founded in our admiration of the excellence of others. Neither can we be satis-
fied by being merely admired for what other people are admired. We must at
least believe ourselves to be admirable for what they are admirable. But in
order to attain this satisfaction, we must become the impartial spectators of our
own character and conduct. We must endeavour to view them with the eyes of
other people, or as other people are likely to view them. When seen in this
light, if they appear to us as we wish, we are happy and contented. But it greatly
confirms this happiness and contentment when we find that other people,
viewing them with those very eyes with which we, in imagination only, were
endeavoring to view them, see them precisely in the same light in which we
ourselves had seen them. Their approbation necessarily confirms our own self-
approbation’ (TMS III.2.3, 114).
12 Smith’s use of vanity in TMS is not always clear-cut. He usually uses the idea of
vanity simply as the desire to attract someone else’s attention toward oneself,
and to receive approbation. The other, whose attention and approbation one
wants, is both the man without as well as the man within. Later in TMS, in
particular when he describes different systems of moral philosophy, Smith uses
the idea of vanity differently. Smith criticizes Mandeville because he is unable
to distinguish between one’s desire to be the object of approbation of a real
spectator and of the impartial spectator. Here Smith defines vanity as the
desire to be approved of even if undeservedly. The vanity to which I am refer-
ring in this chapter is the former and not the latter.
13 Smith’s reliance on markets is not complete. He is well aware of possible
market failure, and he is willing to have government intervene in such situ-
ations. See Viner (1991) and Stigler (1971). See also Arnon (1999), Carlson
(1999), and West (1997).
14 For an account of the history of free banking in England see White (1995). For
a modern version of it see Cowen and Croszner (1994).
15 Cf. Hume (Essays, 363): ‘So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that,
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notwithstanding such a violent shock to public credit, as a voluntary bank-
ruptcy in ENGLAND would occasion, it would not be long ere credit would again
revive in as flourishing a condition as before. . . . And though men are com-
monly more governed by what they have seen, than by what they foresee, with
whatever certainty; yet promises, protestations, fair appearances, with the
allurement of present interest, have such powerful influence as few are able to
resist. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the same baits: the same tricks,
played over and over again, still trepan them.’
16 For an excellent account of Smith’s aversion for war see Fleischacker (2004).
On the role of a standing army in Smith see Montes (2004).
17 ‘It is much better to keep far on the safe side, and never to stretch the public
credit. But, certainly, the limits for such a rich commercial nation as Britain,
extended farther than many have imagined’ Wallace ([1734] 1969), 50–1.
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